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Relationship lending is a common practice in credit financing all over the world, notably 
also in the European Union, which has been assumed to be particularly beneficial for Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs). During recent years, there has been the impression 
that relationship lending loses ground due to a change of the banks’ business models, which 
could ultimately yield to a worsening of the business environment for corporates and 
SMEs. In this study, we investigate the determinants of relationship lending for Germany, 
where relationship lending traditionally plays an important role. Compared to previous 
studies, we refer to much more comprehensive data with information on more than 16,000 
firm-bank relationships. Our findings confirm the assumption that relationship lending 
seems to be an important pillar for economic growth and employment: We find that the 
firms that are most likely to contribute to (future) economic growth, namely small and 
R&D-intensive firms, tend to choose a relationship lender. The same is observed for firms 
of high credit quality, independent of their size or R&D intensity. Furthermore, we also 
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It is common practice in credit ﬁnancing for close ties1 to exist between ﬁrms and
banks, termed relationship lending.2
Relationship lending exists all over the world, including market-oriented banking
systems such as the United States.3 Within the European Union, one of the coun-
tries where relationship lending is supposed to be especially prevalent is Germany,
often cited as the classical example of a bank-based system with strong customer-
borrower-relationships (see, eg, Elsas and Krahnen (1998)). The so-called house
banks are supposed to be particularly important for the ﬁnancing of small and
medium-sized companies, which play a crucial role in Germany, but also in many
other EU economies such as France, and can therefore facilitate economic growth
and employment (see, eg, Wagenvoort (2003); Dietsch (2003)).
However, over the last decade, a trend to less relationship lending is often mentioned
both in market and in bank-based economies. Due to better information processing,
more sophisticated rating tools and the growth of securitization market banks are
supposed to become more and more to credit factories, whereby the credit decision is
supposed to be more and more based on quantitative credit rating or credit scoring
information, whereas qualitative information and personal relations become less
important. Hence, a close bank-ﬁrm relationship gets seemingly less important.
Despite the importance of relationship lending in various EU countries and partic-
ularly in Germany it is remarkable that there are only a limited number of con-
tributions on this subject, which, on top, mostly refer only to a very limited data
base. This is where our study applies: Unlike most studies for Germany (see Elsas
(2005), Machauer and Weber (2000) and Neuberger and R¨ athke (2006)) or other
1 This studies focuses on one import aspect of relationship banking, lending relationships. A
more comprehensive deﬁnition on relationship banking will be given in the next section.
2 We thank Wolfgang Bessler, Ralf Elsas, Bronwyn Hall, Martin Hellwig, Wouter van Overfelt,
Andreas Pﬁngsten, Birgit Schmitz, Isabell Schnabel, Mechthild Schrooten and the participants
at the GBSA 2006 Workshop, the Kleistvilla Workshop 2006, the Verein fuer Socialpolitik 2006
Annual Congress, the DGF 2006 Annual Meeting, MPI Bonn seminar, the SGF 2007 Annual
Meeting, the FMA 2007 European Conference, the 2007 Meeting of the Bundesbank Research
Council and the Bankenworkshop 2007 at the University Muenster for fruitful comments.
3 See, eg, Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Boot (2000).
1countries (see, for example, Detragiache et al. (2000)), our analysis is based on a
comprehensive database with a total of around 16,000 observations with an annual
frequency for the period from 1993 to 2004. Moreover, in contrast to the previous
literature our data set is not only a cross-section of observations, but contains also
the time dimension based on time series of more than one decade. Thus, we are
able to study how diﬀerences between ﬁrms and diﬀerences over time inﬂuence re-
lationship lending. Finally, our deﬁnition of relationship lending diﬀers from the
literature which, except to Elsas (2005), for example, usually refers to the number
of lending relationships as indicators for relationship lending.4 While this variable is
related to the concept of relationship lending, using solely this indicator appears too
restrictive, as companies typically have several lending relationships, particularly
larger ones.
Accordingly, we analyze the determinants of relationship lending. This is done as
follows. First, it is typically assumed that relationship lending helps to reduce in-
formation asymmetries between borrower and lender by the close contact between
the two parties. Therefore, companies that are especially exposed to high informa-
tion problems, such as small companies and companies with a high R&D intensity,
should choose a relationship lender. The evidence of our study is broadly consistent
with these predictions. For young ﬁrms, the outcome is similar, but less signiﬁcant.
Second, we analyze the inﬂuence of the ﬁrm’s creditworthiness on relationship lend-
ing, which is being perceived contradictorily in the theoretical literature. Depending
on the model a ﬁrm’s credit quality inﬂuences the likelihood of relationship lending
negatively (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)), positively (von Thadden (2004)) or the
relation is inversely u-shaped (Rajan (1992)). Our study shows that ﬁrms of a high
credit quality tend to choose a relationship lender and is therefore in line with the
predictions of von Thadden (2004). He explains this result by a positive selection
process over time where bad ﬁrms are more likely to switch from a relationship
lender to an arm’s-length bank than high quality ﬁrms do.
4 This statement applies to the literature regarding the determinants of relationship lending.
Papers which take relationship lending as explanatory variable take a richer set of variables.
2Finally, we also examine whether the importance of relationship lending decreased
since the mid 90s. However, we cannot observe such a trend for Germany.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3 outlines the hypotheses on the nature
of relationship lending. In Section 4 we provide an overview of the underlying data
set. Section 6 addresses descriptive statistics and shows ﬁrst results. The results of
the regressions are presented in Section 7. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Deﬁnition of Relationship Lending
A fundamental prerequisite to investigate relationship banking in general and re-
lationship lending in particular is to begin with an appropriate deﬁnition, notably
as many previous studies on relationship banking merely identiﬁed close bank re-
lationships without becoming more speciﬁc. In a broader sense, there are two core
elements relationship banking is based on, namely that relationship banks (1) engage
in multiple interactions with the respective borrowers (2) through multiple products
and over time and thereby invest in obtaining costly, proprietary information on
borrowers that remains conﬁdential (Boot (2000)). In this study, we investigate one
major dimension of relationship banking, lending relationships between ﬁrms and
banks. Relationship lending exists if a ﬁrm has close ties to a ﬁnancial institution
(Petersen and Rajan (1994)).
In order to investigate relationship lending, it becomes essential to deﬁne appropriate
indicators to measure it, such as the duration of a bank-borrower relationship, the
number of lending relationships or a high share of debt ﬁnancing by one bank.5 We
take the latter indicator, namely (i) a high portion of debt ﬁnancing by one bank,
as our main indicator.6 In addition, we also consider (ii) the number of lending
relationships as an alternative measure in order to enhance the robustness of the
results.
5 See, for example, Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Ongena and Smith (2001).
6 It turns out that a bank that is the dominant lender in one year tends to be the dominant lender
in the following year. Therefore, ﬁrms with a dominant lender tend to have long relationships
with this lender, i.e. the ﬁrst and third measure of relationship lending are correlated.
3According to deﬁnition (ii), we call a bank a relationship lender if a ﬁrm has one
single lending relationship with a bank in contrast to another ﬁrm which has multiple
lending relationships (RL100%). The reasoning for choosing the number of lending
relationships as a proxy is that exclusivity of a bank relationship fosters the ties
between banks and ﬁrms. However, focussing on the number of lending relationships
alone appears too restrictive, and can even lead to misleading results as ﬁrms will
typically have several lending relationships.7 Hence, in order to account for more
general cases, we deﬁne relationship lending as the case in which there exists a bank
with a dominant exposure (deﬁnition i) and set the threshold to 80% (RL80%) and
90% (RL90%), respectively, of the total bank loans of this ﬁrm. The latter indicator,
a high share of ﬁnancial debt at one bank, has empirically been shown to be a good
proxy for relationship lending.8
3 Hypotheses
Subsequently, the importance of borrower characteristics for relationship lending
will be shortly presented from a theoretical perspective. This represents the start-
ing point for the empirical analysis. We will summarize the predictions in three
hypotheses.
In their review of the ﬁnancial intermediation literature, Bhattacharaya and Thakor
(1993) conclude that informational frictions - asymmetric information and propri-
etary information - ”provide the most fundamental explanation for the existence
7 In our sample, the average number of lending relationships is 2.7, while Degryse et al. (2004)
report a mean of around 1.3 lending relationships for Belgium and Sapienza (2002) 9 for Italy.
A cross-country study on the number of lending relationships in 20 European countries based
on data from 1,079 large ﬁrms has been carried out by ?. Their ﬁnding are two-fold: ﬁrst,
they observe that there are substantial diﬀerences across countries, with the average number
of lending relationships ranging from 2.3 in Norway to 15.2 in Italy; second, they ﬁnd that the
number of lending relationships tends to increase with ﬁrm size.
8 Elsas (2005) empirically examined the quality of several potential indicators for relationship
lending, for example the number of lending relationships and the duration of the relationship.
He asked the banks for each customer in his sample if they classiﬁed themselves as relationship
lender and compared these self assessments with the diﬀerent possible indicators for relation-
ship lending. It is shown that a high portion of debt ﬁnancing by one bank has the highest
explanatory power.
4of (ﬁnancial) intermediaries”. This characterization of banks applies particularly
for relationship lenders. Relationship lending implies close ties between borrower
and lender; this facilitates information exchange between the two parties. As house
banks can be assumed to be well informed on the well-being of ﬁrms credit rationing
resulting from information asymmetry becomes relatively unlikely. Lenders invest
in gathering information from their client ﬁrms, and borrowers are more inclined to
reveal proprietary information.
As information asymmetries are especially large for small, young companies, we
expect that relationship lending will be more likely if a company is relatively small
and young. In our analysis, we take the logarithm of the company’s assets and
of the time since the company’s birth as a proxy for size and age, respectively.
Furthermore, we expect relationship lending to become more likely if the ﬁrm is
R&D or knowledge-intensive, as proprietary information exists in such companies.
As the ﬁrm’s R&D intensity cannot be directly measured, we alternatively refer to
information on the R&D and knowledge intensity of the ﬁrms’ industry sector. The
preceding discussion leads us to hypotheses 1 and 2:
Hypothesis 1: The probability of relationship lending decreases with the bor-
rower’s size and age.
Hypothesis 2: The probability of relationship lending increases with the
R&D and knowledge intensity of the borrower’s industry.
Relationship lending does not only come along with beneﬁts, but also with costs.
For example, companies with a relationship lender may face only a soft-budget
constraint which makes it diﬃcult for the relationship lender to enforce the credit
contract (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), see also Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)).
In the event of a default, it is much easier for the company to renegotiate the debt
contract if there is one main creditor than if there were multiple creditors. Thus,
companies with a relationship lender have a greater incentive to default strategically,
while ﬁrms with a large number of creditors tend to be disciplined by their lenders.
However, the costs of ineﬃcient renegotiation which exist with multiple creditors
5prevail also if the ﬁrm defaults for liquidity reasons. Thus, there exists a trade
oﬀ between preventing strategic defaults (best achieved with multiple creditors)
and low cost of renegotiation in case of liquidity defaults (best achieved with one
creditor). As companies of a lower credit quality are likely to face a higher risk of a
liquidity default, they could ensure that they receive high liquidation values, choose
one creditor or concentrate their borrowing on one bank, their relationship lender.
Partly contradictory results are delivered by the models of Rajan (1992) and von
Thadden (2004). The model of Rajan (1992) shows an additional reason why rela-
tionship lending may be costly, namely the hold-up problem. Unlike arm’s-length
lenders, relationship lenders obtain private information about borrowers which en-
ables them to stop ineﬃcient projects, but gives them also an ”information monopoly”.
They could threat not to prolong a loan, thereby enforcing relatively high interest
rates and reducing the incentives of the ﬁrm’s owner. Thus, relationship lend-
ing is valuable for stopping ineﬃcient projects whereas arm’s length debt is good
for providing high incentives. Rajan shows that ﬁrms of low credit quality prefer
arm’s-length debt, whereas ﬁrms with medium-quality projects tend to choose a
relationship lender. High quality ﬁrms are indiﬀerent.
The model of von Thadden (2004) analyzes also the hold-up-problem, but, unlike
Rajan (1992), it is assumed that binding long-term contracts are not possible (see
also Sharpe (1990)). At the reﬁnancing stage, the terms of the credit contract
are then determined by competition between the inside (relationship) lender and
potential outside investors. He shows that there is a positive selection process where
bad ﬁrms are more likely than high quality ﬁrms to switch from the insider lender to
an arm’s-length bank. Therefore, high-quality ﬁrms are more likely to be ﬁnanced
by relationship lenders.
We measure a ﬁrm’s creditworthiness with its probability of default (PD), which is
derived from a separate model.
Hypothesis 3 summarizes the above discussion:
Hypothesis 3: The probability of relationship lending depends on the bor-
rower’s creditworthiness.
6Hypothesis 3a: The probability of relationship lending decreases with the bor-
rower’s creditworthiness. [Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)]
Hypothesis 3b: The probability of relationship lending is low for ﬁrms of low
credit quality, high for medium-quality ﬁrms and mediocre for
high-quality ﬁrms. [Rajan (1992)]
Hypothesis 3c: The probability of relationship lending increases with the bor-
rower’s creditworthiness. [von Thadden (2004)]
4 Data
The ﬁnal database used in this study is composed of three diﬀerent databases of
Deutsche Bundesbank: i) the German credit register, containing single bank-ﬁrm
credit relationships, ii) balance sheet data of German ﬁrms and iii) balance sheet
data and audit reports of German banks. The data set used for this study thereby
provides information as to whether a bank grants credit to a speciﬁc ﬁrm (through
data set i) as well as the characteristics of the corresponding ﬁrms (ii) and banks
(iii). Next, we will ﬁrst provide information on the three databases in general and
then elaborate more on the merged subset that has been used for this study.
The German credit register contains quarterly data on large exposures of banks
to individual borrowers or single borrower units (eg groups). Banking institutions
located in Germany are required to submit reports if their exposures to an individual
borrower or the sum of exposures to borrowers belonging to one borrower unit
exceeds the threshold of EUR 1.5m (formerly DEM 3m) once in the respective
quarter.9 As the banks have to report the quarter-end indebtedness, and particularly
due to measuring indebtedness at the borrower unit level rather than for single
credit entities, about 43% of all exposures in the database are below EUR 1.5m (see
9 See section 14 of the German Banking Act.
7Schmieder (2006)), which allows to use the data also to draw conclusions on (larger)
SMEs. In the last quarter of 2004, for example, the credit register contained more
than 750,000 reported bank-borrower-relationships, indicating the sheer size of the
database.
The second data source used for this study, the corporate balance sheet database
of Deutsche Bundesbank, is one of the most comprehensive databases for German
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The database contains a total number of up to 60,000 ﬁrm
balance sheets per year during the 1990s and approximately 20,000 ﬁrms since 2000.
In order to ensure that the data are representative, we have accounted both for a
potential quality bias resulting from the collection mechanism as well as for a bias
towards larger ﬁrms as further discussed below.
Third, the balance sheet data of the German banks comprises the annual balance
sheets and proﬁt & loss accounts of all German banks and of some types of ﬁnancial
service providers (trade balances). In addition, it contains the yearly quantitative
audit reports, which include information about the bank’s loan quality and its reg-
ulatory capital.
For the purpose of this study, we used merged subset data from all three data
sources.10 Out of 3,288 ﬁrms that have been merged, roughly 60 ﬁrms have been
excluded from the study for data quality reasons based on robustness tests. The
ﬁnal merged data set contains annual data from 3,231 ﬁrms as well as 11 groups
(or borrower units) for the period from 1993 to 2004. In terms of the number of
10 Whereas the German credit register and the balance sheet data of German banks are based
on a common identiﬁer for banks and can therefore be easily merged, the match between the
credit register and the corporate balance has been done based on ﬁve ﬁrm criteria: i) name, ii)
location, iii) legal form, iv) industry and v) an indicator comparing a ﬁrm’s total indebtedness
as stated by the credit register relative to bank loans shown by the balance sheet data. The
last two criteria were primarily used as additional criteria in case of uncertainty about the
validity of the match. Besides, additional information from the internet was used to check the
correctness of the match.
8observations, the ﬁnal data set contains 16,349 observations based.11 The resulting
overall database has three dimensions: a time dimension, a dimension for the lenders
and a dimension for the borrowers. In order to be able to use a panel framework, one
of the three dimensions of the data set, the lender dimension, has been eliminated
by referring to average bank characteristics per ﬁrm. The respective procedure is
explained in the Appendix.
Regarding the representativeness of the ﬁnal data set for the purpose of this study,
we focussed on two potential issues, namely a bias resulting from the matching
procedure (as companies may have not been selected randomly) and resulting from
the original databases themselves, notably the truncation in the credit register. In
both dimension, we found a certain increase in ﬁrm size, but the median ﬁrm in
the ﬁnal sample is still relatively small with a revenue of EUR 16m, so the outcome
seems to be representative except for very small companies.
5 Variable deﬁnitions
Before entering the empirical analysis, we seek to deﬁne the most important depen-
dent and explanatory variable used in this study.
5.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is being speciﬁed based on the deﬁnition of relationship
lending given in section 2. We refer to a dummy variable for deﬁnition i (denoting
a high share of borrowing from one single bank) and the logarithmized number of
lending relationships (deﬁnition ii). Both measures are only based on information
11 In order to align the data sources with one another, the higher frequency of the quarterly credit
register data was reduced by calculating four-quarter averages (aggregation method ii). In this
way, one of the shortcomings of the credit register’s reporting threshold can be mitigated,
namely that only loans above EUR 1.5m are included. By referring to averages of quarterly
values, smaller loans which exceed the threshold only in one quarter are more likely to be
captured. As a robustness check, we have also included the values of the quarter to which
the balance sheet accounts refer to, yielding to a total of 15,947 observations, referred to as
aggregation method i.
9from the credit register, as the deﬁnitions of debt are too diﬀerent in the credit
register and the corporate accounts statistics. As part of the bank loans which
fall below the reporting threshold are not shown in the credit register this fact can
potentially result to overstating a bank’s debt ﬁnancing. To account for this, we
apply relatively strict measures of relationship lending (minimum share of a ﬁrm’s
bank loans of 80% or even more), so the identiﬁed relationship lenders are likely
to be those found via more common deﬁnitions of relationship lending and ”full”
information on the credit side.
5.2 Explanatory Variables
We use a default risk measure (PD), which is calculated from the balance sheet
data and can be interpreted as a one-year probability of default of the ﬁrms.12
We measure the R&D/knowledge intensity with a dummy variable which relies on
long-term industry averages. The dummy becomes one if an industry was classiﬁed
as R&D-intensive in Grupp and Legler (2000). Cyclicality is measured as the long-
run sensitivity of each industry’s gross value added to changes in the aggregated
gross value added.
In order to determine concentration in the banking market, we referred to the HHI13
based on 67 German regions14.
6 Descriptive statistics and ﬁrst results
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for the main indicator of relationship lending
used in this study, a high concentration of borrowing on one single bank. Accord-
12 We referred to a binary logistic regression model with a high discriminatory power. See Krueger
et al. (2005) for further information.
13 The Hirschmann-Herﬁndahl-Index (HHI), which is the sum of the squared portfolio portions
14 Deutsche Bundesbank uses a proprietary to deﬁne regions in Germany, the so-called ”ortsnum-
mer”. The ”ortsnummer” of a German region or city is the code for the respective branch of
the Bundesbank that is responsible for this region or city. The average size of these regions is
approximately 5,000sqkm.
10ingly, 54.2% (48.2%) of the ﬁrms in the sample raise at least 80% (90%) of their
bank loans from one bank.15
Table 4 gives information on the distribution of the number of lending relationships
in the sample: 41% of the companies in the sample have only one lending relationship
and roughly 90% of the ﬁrms have 6 lending relationships or less. The maximum is
115 lending relationships.16
Table 5 shows the pairwise correlations of diﬀerent house bank indicators. The cor-
relation between the logarithmised number of lending relations (”ln NOB”), RL80%
and RL90% is at least (-)75% . At the 0.1% level, all variables are signiﬁcantly cor-
related. This points to the conclusion that the indicators contain relatively similar
information.17
Table 6 summarizes descriptive statistics the explanatory variables used in this
study.18 The table shows that the ﬁrms exhibit a high creditworthiness19, are rela-
tively well established (average age 44.4 years) and that a substantial portion of the
ﬁrms are SMEs (legal form ”GmbH”, asset below EUR 50m). Moreover, the table
shows that one out of eight ﬁrms belongs to a R&D intense industry sector. For the
banks, the average size in terms of total assets is about EUR 100bn. The level of the
HHI indicates that the concentration in the banking market is relatively moderate.
6.2 First results
Next, we investigate our hypotheses using descriptive statistics and simple tests
before moving forward to the regressions. We concentrate on one indicator, concen-
15 The corresponding values for the aggregation method based on the quarterly averages are
slightly higher.
16 It has been ensured based on robustness checks that this number that appears to be very
high, is appropriate. It occurred for a large German ﬁrm settled in various locations, whereby
lending relationships with various diﬀerent local banks have been established. For a relatively
small sample of large European ﬁrms, ? ﬁnd a maximum of 70 lending relationships for Italy,
which further conﬁrms that the maximum used in this study seems to be adequate.
17 As outlined before, the logarithmized number of lending relationships will be used for robust-
ness purposes.
18 As a means of quality check, all variables have been analyzed for outliers. To ensure robust
results, we have censorized the equity ratio at one percent and 99%, respectively.
19 The average equity ratio is 18.9%, the return on assets 4.7% and the average Probability of
Default 0.52%.)
11tration of debt of at least 80% at one bank. Table 7 shows that there is a strong
negative correlation between a ﬁrm’s size and its concentration of borrowing. The
share of companies which borrow at least 80% of their credit from one bank steadily
decreases with ﬁrm size. The same holds true for the share of the largest lender.
This outcome is in line with our expectations (Hypothesis 1) that especially small
informationally opaque ﬁrms choose a relationship lender.
Table 8 gives the means of ﬁrm variables subject to diﬀerent size classes and con-
ditioned by the relationship lending status. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrm age, R&D inten-
sity and variables about a ﬁrm’s quality (for example equity ratio) interfere with
size and are therefore analyzed conditional on the ﬁrm size. Table 8 shows that
R&D-intensive ﬁrms are more likely to choose a relationship lender. In each size
class, companies with a relationship lender have a signiﬁcantly higher R&D intensity
than companies without a relationship lender. The only exception are very large
companies where no signiﬁcant diﬀerence exists. This evidence is consistent with
Hypothesis 2 according to which R&D-intensive companies are exposed to higher
information asymmetries and therefore tend to concentrate their borrowing on one
bank. However, the relation between age and choosing a relationship lender is not
in line with hypothesis 1. Whereas small companies with a relationship lender are,
on average, signiﬁcantly older than small companies without a relationship lender,
the reverse is true for large companies.
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c examine the inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s quality on relationship
lending. Accordingly, the relationship between a ﬁrm’s credit quality (measured
by its PD or equity ratio) and the likelihood of relationship lending can be neg-
ative, inversely u-shaped or positively. As table 8 shows, medium-sized and large
companies with a relationship lender exhibit signiﬁcantly higher equity ratios and
signiﬁcant lower PD-values than medium-sized and large companies without a re-
lationship lender, while small companies do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect to
both variables. This evidence indicates that high-quality ﬁrms above a certain size
threshold tend to choose a relationship lender which is in line with hypothesis 3c
and to some extent with hypothesis 3b.
127 Regressions
In the regressions, we focus again on the dependent variable ”high share of debt
ﬁnancing by one bank (80% level)” (RL80%). Additionally, we run regressions with
alternative indicators of relationship lending to ensure that the results are robust.
As our dependent variable is a dummy variable, we use limited dependent variable
models. A shortcoming of these models for panel data sets is that a ﬁxed eﬀects re-
gression is only possible for such observations where the dependent variable changed
at least once during the sample period, while the other observations are excluded
from the sample (see Baltagi (2005)). This procedure may lead to a bias as ﬁrms
included in the regression (i.e. those that change their relationship lending status)
can be systematically diﬀerent from the excluded ﬁrms. We thus use a ﬁxed and a
random eﬀects model and discuss the results of both models. 20.
Table 9 summarizes the regression results. We consider the lenders’ average size as
a control variable which is highly signiﬁcant in statistical and economic terms. The
negative sign is in line with evidence for Italy according to which especially small
banks act as single or relationship lenders (see Detragiache et al. (2000)). Small
banks probably have an advantage in processing soft information which is especially
valuable for relationship lending (see Stein (2000)).
We also control for the degree of competition as measured by the Hirschmann-
Herﬁndahl-Index (HHI). We ﬁnd that relationship lending tends to get more likely
the lower the HHI and therefore the higher the competition in the lender’s market
is. The variable is signiﬁcant only in the random eﬀects speciﬁcations. This re-
sult is generally consistent with the predictions of the model of Boot and Thakor
(2000). The authors show that increasing competition between banks leads to more
relationship banking and less transaction banking, as relationship orientation helps
20 A decision as to which model is more appropriate could also be done based on a Hausman test.
However, a standard Hausman test compares the results of two models with diﬀerent sets of
observations. Furthermore, in the case of our regressions, the Hausman test statistics do not
show clear results (the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed and the random eﬀects model is signiﬁcant
only at the 10% level)
13to partially insulate the banks from pure price competition. The result contradicts
Petersen and Rajan (1995).
Moreover, we included year dummies to examine the time trend in our data set.
Generally, the dummies are neither signiﬁcant in the random nor in the ﬁxed eﬀects
model. The coeﬃcients do not show a clear trend and heavily depend on the speciﬁ-
cation (for example model 3 versus model 5). Therefore, our results do not support
the common view that banks have developed to credit factories and relationship
lending has become less important.
According to Hypothesis 1 we expect informationally opaque small, young companies
to prefer relationship lending. Concentrating their borrowing on one bank may help
such ﬁrms to reduce information asymmetries and to avoid credit rationing. The
results show that age and especially size are statistically and economically important
variables for determining the probability of choosing a relationship lender. If size
increases by 1%, the probability of relationship lending decreases by 4% in the
random eﬀects model. The coeﬃcient in the ﬁxed eﬀects model is roughly the same.
Age decreases the probability of relationship lending as well. Older companies are
signiﬁcantly less likely to choose relationship lending. If age increases by 1%, the
probability of relationship lending decreases by about 0.25% (random eﬀects model).
Surprisingly, the eﬀect of age is about three and a half times larger in the ﬁxed eﬀects
than in the random eﬀects model.
Hypotheses 2 examines whether R&D- and knowledge-intensive ﬁrms are more likely
to choose a relationship lender. If relationship lending is an eﬃcient instrument for
reducing information asymmetries, R&D- and knowledge-intensive companies should
concentrate their borrowing on one relationship lender, as R&D activities are linked
with proprietary information and information asymmetries are higher. We measure
R&D/knowledge intensity with a dummy variable which relies on long-term indus-
try averages. As this variable is time-constant, we can test Hypothesis 2 only in
a panel regression with random eﬀects. The results are in line with our predic-
tion: R&D/knowledge-intensive companies are signiﬁcantly more likely to choose a
relationship lender. The probability increases by 13 percentage points.
14Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c examine the inﬂuence of the ﬁrm’s creditworthiness. The
theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s credit quality
on the probability of relationship lending. Depending on the theoretical model, a
negative, an inversely u-shaped or a positive relation is possible. We measure a ﬁrm’s
credit quality with its PD (probability of default) and include a linear and a squared
term to capture non-linear relations. At ﬁrst glance, table 9 indicates a u-shaped
inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s PD on the likelihood of relationship lending and thus does
not support either of these predictions. The linear and the squared term are both
signiﬁcant. However, when calculating the combined eﬀect over the range of relevant
PD values it becomes clear that the inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s PD is negative for most
observations. A ﬁrm’s creditworthiness aﬀects the probability of relationship lending
positively only for very high PD values (values beyond the 98% quantile for ﬁxed and
random eﬀects model). Overall, the results are consistent with Hypothesis 3c which
is based on the model of von Thadden (2004). Accordingly, there exists a selection
process over time where good ﬁrms stay at their relationship bank and bad ﬁrms
choose an arm’s-length bank. On average, relationship lenders thus ﬁnance ﬁrms of
higher credit quality than arm’s length banks do. The results are also to some extent
consistent with hypothesis 3b (model of Rajan (1992)) as the hypothesis states
that high-quality ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between arm’s-length ﬁnance and relationship
lending. The model derives the decision for relationship lending from a trade-oﬀ
between an eﬃcient decision about which projects to ﬁnance versus providing high
incentives to exert eﬀort.
The results are not in line with the model of Bolton and Scharfstein, which predicts
a negative inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s credit quality on the likelihood of relationship lending
(Hypothesis 3a). The authors derive the optimal numbers of creditors from a trade-
oﬀ between preventing strategic defaults and high renegotiation costs in the case of
liquidity defaults.
One may be concerned that endogeneity problems may inﬂuence our results and may
lead to reverse causality. For example, age may not only inﬂuence the likelihood
of choosing a relationship lender, but the existence of a relationship lender may
15also increase a ﬁrm’s survival probability and thereby the age distribution in our
sample. Endogeneity problems may be relevant with regard to age and size, but are
probably minor important or not relevant with regard to a ﬁrm’s R&D-intensity or
a ﬁrm’s creditworthiness. However, as to age and size, endogeneity issues work into
the opposite direction as our hypothesis states. Whereas our hypothesis states that
young and small companies should choose a relationship lender, the endogeneity bias
would lead to the eﬀect that old and large companies are ﬁnanced by relationship
lenders. Therefore, if there is an endogeneity bias, it would reduce the eﬀect of age
and size. This may also explain the below results that age is not robustly signiﬁcant.
Robustness checks
We ran several robustness checks. Firstly, we checked whether the inﬂuence of
ﬁrm size results from information asymmetries or from the fact that banks avoid
concentration risk.21 For larger ﬁrms with - on average - larger credit exposures
banks need more regulatory capital, implying that concentration risk in the bank’s




liable capital of company i’s smallest bank
> 5%.22
In the new regression, the coeﬃcient of size goes sharply down, in the ﬁxed eﬀects
model by over 30%, in the random eﬀects model even by nearly 40%. However, the
coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcant at the 1%-level in both models. We also ran a regression
where we lowered the threshold further to 2%. Here, the eﬀects are slightly more
pronounced than in the model with a threshold of 5%, but the variables are, once
again, signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.23
21 One potential additional explanation for the ﬁrm size eﬀect are transaction costs. We implicitly
controlled for this eﬀect by including the asset size, so it is unlikely that transaction costs play
a material role. However, the eﬀect will be further investigated.
22 The Large Exposures Regulation (German: ”Grosskreditrichtlinie”) sets a limit of 10% above
which exposures have to be reported to Deutsche Bundesbank. This is also the threshold set
by the Basel II framework.
23 We acknowledge, however, that the robustness test may itself result again to bias, as smaller
banks are more often excluded than larger one, so the robustness check may not provide
ultimate clariﬁcation on this issue.
16Secondly, we ran several regressions to check how the problem of truncation in the
credit register inﬂuences the results. As loans of less than EUR 1.5 million are only
partly reported (see Section 4), the credit register shows a biased picture of the debt
structure of companies. Firstly, we constructed variables combining information
from the credit register (CR) with the balance sheet statistics (BS). Data from these
two data sources may diﬀer because i) loans of less than EUR 1.5m are only partly
reported in the credit register and ii) the data sources apply diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of debt. As we are only interested in the eﬀects of truncation, we constructed a
new indicator for relationship lending in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we created
an auxiliary variable which classiﬁes a borrower as a customer with a relationship
lender if
RLtemp = 1 if
largest loan according to CR
P
bank loans according to BS
> 80%.24
RLtemp = 0 otherwise
We use a narrow deﬁnition of debt and include only bank loans in the denominator
(see discussion in Section 4). When we compare the new variable with our old
indicator RL80%, the two variables are identical in the ideal case. If the new one
is 0 and the old one is 1, this is probably due to truncation in the register as for
example smaller exposures of other banks are not shown. However, if the new one
is 1 and the old one is 0, this combination is probably due to diﬀerent deﬁnitions in
the data sources. We thus combined the two indicators:
RLBSCR = min[RL80%,RLtemp]
Table 10 shows the results using RLBSCR as the dependent variable (model 3 and
4). The results diﬀer quantitatively, but are qualitatively similar. The coeﬃcients
24 The credit register contains information about the structure of debt (oﬀ-balance sheet versus
on-balance sheet) only since 1997. Therefore, we used data on total loans until 1996 and data
on on-balance sheet loans since 1997.
17of size and R&D intensity are smaller with the new indicator and the eﬀect of age is
not signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed eﬀects model. We also ran regressions where we built our
auxiliary variable referring to a broader deﬁnition of debt (bank loans, acceptances
and bonds) and built the new combined indicator based on this broader deﬁnition.
The results are similar to the speciﬁcation with RLBSCR. Except for age, these
regressions conﬁrm our above results.25
The credit register shows a more reliable picture for those companies where the
sum of loans from the credit register is relatively high compared to the debt in the
balance sheet. Therefore, we ran a second robustness check regarding truncation by
restricting our observations to those companies where the sum of loans in the credit
register is least 80% of the corresponding amount in the balance sheet statistics.26
As Table 10 (model 5 and 6) shows, coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance levels change only
minor. Size, age and credit quality are signiﬁcant in the random and the ﬁxed eﬀects
speciﬁcation as well as R&D-intensity in the random eﬀects model (which cannot
be considered in the ﬁxed eﬀects model).
Furthermore, as especially small companies are exposed to the problem of truncation,
we conducted a third robustness check with respect to truncation where we excluded
small companies (assets below median) from our sample. The regression also leads
to similar results (results not reported).
Finally, we conducted several robustness checks with respect to our dependent vari-
able. We used the (log of) the number of relationships as the dependent variable.
The results are similar to those above except that age is not signiﬁcant anymore,
while the signiﬁcance of size increases. As the two variables are signiﬁcantly cor-
related, the coeﬃcient of size may also partly show the eﬀect of age. Moreover,
we changed the threshold of our relationship lending indicator. We increased (de-
creased) the threshold to 90% (70%), ie banks that ﬁnance at least 90% (70%) of a
ﬁrm’s loans are now classiﬁed as relationship lenders. The results are very similar
25 We also controlled for the type of balance sheet (tax or trade balance) in order to exclude a
potential eﬀect resulting from this. As the variable is generally not signiﬁcant, this can be
excluded.
26 As the credit register provides information about balance sheet loans only since 1997, we used
a ﬁrm’s total indebtedness before 1997.
18to the above results. Finally, we calculated our relationship lending indicator based
on aggregation method ii, which uses the yearly average values of the credit register
instead of the values of the balance sheet quarter. The results are once again very
similar.
8 Conclusion
In this study, we empirically analyze factors that determine relationship lending in
a major EU economy, Germany. Unlike most previous empirical contributions, the
data set used in this study is much more comprehensive.
Starting from the theoretical literature, we analyze the determinants for relationship
lending in Germany. We ﬁnd that relationship lending apparently reduces informa-
tion asymmetries and thereby helps credit rationing to be avoided. In line with
this argument, we ﬁnd that small and R&D-intensive ﬁrms, which are supposed
to particularly contribute to economic growth and employment, tend to choose a
relationship lender. This does also apply to young ﬁrms, also if to a lesser degree.
Whereas the eﬀect of size and age is a common result in the literature, the eﬀect of
the R&D-intensity is partly in contrast to international evidence (see eg Detragiache
et al. (2000)). Due to underdeveloped equity markets in Germany R&D-intensive
ﬁrms rely more heavily on bank credits than in other countries, so relationship
lending could therefore also serve the role as a means to substitute equity ﬁnancing.
Second, we examine how a ﬁrm’s credit quality inﬂuences the likelihood of relation-
ship lending. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms of high credit quality tend to choose a relationship
lender. This is in line with a positive selection process over time where good bor-
rowers stay at their relationship lender and bad borrowers switch to (outside) arm’s
length banks.
Finally, we also investigate whether relationship lending became less important since
the mid 90s, which, however, cannot be observed for Germany.
This data set makes it possible to investigate further important questions concerning
relationship lending. Possible research topics are: the duration of lending relation-
19ships, the impact of relationship lending on a ﬁrm’s funding costs, and the behavior
of a relationship bank when the borrower is in ﬁnancial distress.
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23Appendix
Processing of data (Example)
Below, a hypothetical example of how the raw data have been processed is shown.
From the credit register we obtain the following information about the indebtedness
of the four ﬁrms A1, A2, B and C with respect to the banks 1, 2, 3, 4 (See Table 1,
Table 1: Data from the Credit Register (extract)
Firm Bank Year Indebtedness (th EUR)
A1 1 1999 700
A1 2 1999 1800
A2 1 1999 900
B 1 1999 50000
B 2 1999 1600
B 4 1999 1400
C 3 1999 2000
please note that the ﬁrms A1 and A2 belong to the borrower unit A). As mentioned
above (See Section 4), not all exposures reported in the credit register are above the
threshold of EUR 1.5m. The reason why bank 1 has to report the exposures to the
ﬁrms A1 and A2 is that the combined exposure, ie the exposure to the borrower
unit A, is above the threshold. The exposure of bank 4 to ﬁrm B has to be reported
because presumably this exposure was above the EUR 1.5m threshold at least once
in the preceding quarter (and the requirement to report depends on the maximum
exposure during the preceding quarter whereas the exposure to be reported is that
of the quarter end).
We condense the data set by i) aggregating the ﬁrms to borrower units where ad-
equate (ﬁrm in balance sheet statistics is a group) and ii) by replacing the lending
information by summary statistics. The data processing in our example results in
24Table 2: Final data set (extract)
Firm Year Total indebted- Largest bank Number of Share of largest Bank ID of
ness (th EUR) loan (th EUR) lending rel. bank loan relationship lender
A 1999 3400 1800 2 52.9% N/A
B 1999 53000 50000 3 94.3% 1
C 1999 2000 2000 1 100.0% 3
the data set as displayed in Table 2. It has to be noted that the actual ﬁnal data
set additionally contains the ﬁrms’ and the banks’ balance sheets.
25Table 3: Concentration of borrowing: descriptive statistics
Dependent Variable RL80% RL90%
Share of observations 54.1 48.2
N 16349 16349
RL80% (RL90%) denotes that a ﬁrm concentrates at least 80% (90%) of its borrowing at one bank.
The information shown in the table is based on aggregation method ii) (see section on data).
Table 4: Number of lending relationships per ﬁrm











The information shown in the table is based on aggregation method ii) (see section on data). For
aggregation method i), the results are comparable.
26Table 5: Correlation matrix of relationship lending indicators
Dependent Variable ln NoB RL90% RL80%
ln NoB 1
RL90% -0.77 1
RL80% -0.75 0.89 1
ln NoB denotes the logarithmised number of lending relationships. RL90% and RL80% denote
concentration of bank borrowing at 90% and 80% respectively. All variables are signiﬁcantly
correlated at the 0.1% level. The information shown in the table is based on aggregation method
ii) (see section on data).
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
Variable Unit Obs Mean Std. Dev. Quantiles
25% 75%
Total assets (ﬁrm) EUR 1000 16349 126907 1541739 4293 34528
Age (ﬁrm) years 14477 44.4 41.8 16.0 63.0
Equity ratio (ﬁrm) % 16348 18.9 17.9 5.0 27.7
Return on assets (ﬁrm), % % 16347 4.7 14.1 0.1 8.6
Probability of Default (ﬁrm), % % 14459 0.52 0.14 0.13 0.61
Corporation (AG or KGaA), % % 16349 8.9
Limited liability corporation (GmbH), % % 16349 49.7
Cyclicality (ﬁrm’s industry), % % 14974 69.1 116.5 -6.0 138.4
R&D intensive (ﬁrm’s industry) % 16349 12.7
Total assets (banks) EUR m 16230 99399 128615 4349 148462
Regional HHI (bank), % % 16346 5.2 3.1 3.1 6.3
The Probability of Default (PD) denotes a one-year ratio determined based on a binary logit
model. Cyclicality is measured as the long-run sensitivity of each industry’s gross value added to
changes in the aggregated gross value added. R&D intensity is a dummy variable which is equal
to one if an industry was classiﬁed as R&D-intensive in Grupp and Legler (2000). The regional
concentration in the banking market (Regional HHI) has been determined based on 67 German
regions (see section on variable deﬁnitions.
27Table 7: Relationship lending by ﬁrm size
N RL80% Mean lending share of largest lender
<= EUR 2.5m 1778 94.5 97.6
EUR 2.5m - 5m 2806 88.6 95.1
EUR 5m - 10m 3152 71.4 87.6
EUR 10m - 25m 3263 46.6 75.0
EUR 25m - 100m 2884 32.0 63.9
> EUR 100m 2064 20.3 53.4














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 9: Panel regression (1)
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable RL80% RL80%
log assets (ﬁrm) -1.170 -1.306
(25.15)*** (8.24)***
age (ﬁrm) -0.187 -0.664
(2.90)*** (2.43)**
PD (lagged, ﬁrm) -0.657 -0.493
(5.08)*** (2.78)***
squared PD (lagged, ﬁrm) 0.113 0.104
(3.91)*** (2.49)**
R&D intensive (ﬁrm’s industry) 0.583
(4.39)***
log assets (bank(s)) -0.381 -0.312
(13.59)*** (7.47)***
regional concentration (bank’s market) -0.038 -0.020
(2.60)*** (1.18)
tax balance 0.113 0.174
(1.14) (1.47)
year = 1995 -0.053 -0.019
(0.38) (0.13)
year = 1996 0.029 0.057
(0.20) (0.37)
year = 1997 0.073 0.135
(0.52) (0.84)
year = 1998 0.001 0.056
(0.00) (0.33)
year = 1999 0.217 0.303
(1.41) (1.68)*
year = 2000 0.188 0.264
(1.21) (1.40)
year = 2001 0.180 0.319
(1.12) (1.61)
year = 2002 0.300 0.565
(1.81)* (2.68)***
year = 2003 0.152 0.340
(0.88) (1.54)





Number of borrowers 1984 612
Panel method random ﬁxed
The table shows the coeﬃcients with the t-values in parentheses. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable which is equal to one if a ﬁrm concentrates at least 80% of its borrowing at one
bank (RL80%).
The Probability of Default (PD) denotes a one-year ratio determined based on a binary logit
model. R&D intensity is a dummy variable which equals one if the borrower’s industry is R&D- or
knowledge-intensive. The HHI shows the regional concentration in the banking market. The tax
balance is a dummy variable to ensure that the results are not driven by the balance sheet type
referred to. The PD and the regional concentration are measures in percentage. The ﬁrms’ and
banks’ assets are measured in real terms.
***/**/* indicate statistically signiﬁcant results at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 30Table 10: Panel regression (2)
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dependent Variable RLBSCR RLBSCR RL80% RL80%
log assets (ﬁrm) -0.782 -0.809 -1.136 -0.815
(17.72)*** (5.35)*** (22.02)*** (4.26)***
age (ﬁrm) -0.121 -0.161 -0.217 -0.654
(1.90)* (0.60) (2.95)*** (1.85)*
PD (lagged, ﬁrm) -0.668 -0.551 -0.852 -0.576
(5.54)*** (3.31)*** (5.57)*** (2.71)***
squared PD (lagged, ﬁrm) 0.098 0.096 0.116 0.080
(4.19)*** (2.89)*** (3.56)*** (1.84)*
R&D intensive (ﬁrm’s industry) 0.257 0.519
(1.96)** (3.42)***
log assets (bank(s)) -0.122 -0.124 -0.369 -0.307
(4.61)*** (2.99)*** (10.61)*** (5.14)***
regional concentration (bank’s market) -0.036 -0.012 -0.049 -0.016
(2.45)** (0.68) (2.70)*** (0.71)
tax balance 0.050 0.082 0.124 0.291
(0.50) (0.68) (1.04) (1.92)*
year = 1995 0.176 0.198 0.032 0.017
(1.31) (1.36) (0.19) (0.09)
year = 1996 0.115 0.077 0.073 0.015
(0.85) (0.52) (0.44) (0.08)
year = 1997 -0.499 -0.615 0.046 0.021
(3.64)*** (3.96)*** (0.27) (0.10)
year = 1998 -0.348 -0.386 0.087 0.142
(2.44)** (2.34)** (0.49) (0.66)
year = 1999 -0.092 -0.080 0.311 0.411
(0.61) (0.45) (1.67)* (1.76)*
year = 2000 -0.072 -0.034 0.313 0.338
(0.48) (0.18) (1.66)* (1.40)
year = 2001 -0.119 -0.058 0.362 0.474
(0.77) (0.30) (1.86)* (1.87)*
year = 2002 0.022 0.165 0.435 0.730
(0.13) (0.80) (2.17)** (2.68)***
year = 2003 -0.118 -0.007 0.227 0.417
(0.69) (0.03) (1.09) (1.48)
year = 2004 0.220 0.402 0.815 1.029
(1.00) (1.50) (3.13)*** (3.12)***
Constant 8.356 15.991
(17.25)*** (25.99)***
Observations 10426 4427 7872 2557
Number of borrowers 1984 672 1750 410
Panel method random ﬁxed random ﬁxed
The table shows the coeﬃcients with the t-values in parentheses.
Model 3 and model 4 are robustness checks with an alternative relationship lending indicator
(RLBSCR). Model 5 and 6 restrict the sample to those companies where the sum of loans in the
credit register is at least 80% of the amount in the balance sheet statistics in order to ensure
that the results are not driven by the potential mismatches of the databases used on the study.
The dependent variable for model 5 and 6 is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a ﬁrm
concentrates at least 80% of its borrowing at one bank (RL80%).
The Probability of Default (PD) denotes a one-year ratio determined based on a binary logit
model. R&D intensity is a dummy variable which equals one if the borrower’s industry is R&D- or
knowledge-intensive. The HHI shows the regional concentration in the banking market. The tax
balance is a dummy variable to ensure that the results are not driven by the balance sheet type
referred to. The PD and the regional concentration are measures in percentage. The ﬁrms’ and
banks’ assets are measured in real terms.
***/**/* indicate statistically signiﬁcant results at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
31